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1 Introduction
What explains the robust disposition toward `sticking' in the Monty Hall task?1 A va-
riety of plausible explanations have been posited: that humans are poor at probability
reasoning in general and conditional probability reasoning in particular; that sticking is a
manifestation of a default eect which defends against perceived strategic manipulation,
or is triggered by the absence of clear decision-making cues; that by construction, the task
induces an illusion of control eect; and that sticking reects the preference for errors of
omission over errors of commission.
Several extensions of the Monty Hall task are eective in reducing non-rational re-
sponses: repetition with feedback (Friedman, 1998), social learning (Palacios-Huerta,
2003), markets containing sophisticated traders (Kluger and Wyatt, 2004), institutions
(competition and communication) (Slembeck and Tyran, 2004), learning through prac-
tice in valuing an engineered nancial asset (Kluger and Friedman, 2010), and explicit
guidance of intuition (Krauss and Wang, 2003). However, to date the literature does not
include an experiment in which Monty Hall's bias triggers are tackled at source, resolving
the problem of non-rational responses while preserving the one-shot nature of the task.
The experiment reported here is designed to ll this gap. It consists of a baseline
treatment (T0), a treatment that reverses the directionality of the three above-mentioned
task-triggered biases (T1), a treatment that eliminates the triggers for these biases (T2),
and a treatment that reveals the error rate in subjects' unconditional probability reasoning
responses (T3). Subjects are sampled from a pool of numerate students, who by self-
selection and training have experience with probability reasoning problems and their
solution. Accordingly, these data speak to the eects of (i) subject sophistication and (ii)
task-embedded bias triggers.
In the standard one-shot Monty Hall task, rational response rates of 10%{13% are
typical (Friedman, 1998; Krauss and Wang, 2003). In contrast, 79% of our full sample
of sophisticated subjects (N = 71) choose rationally in the baseline treatment T0. And
among the n=49 subjects who recognize the Monty Hall task, 96% choose rationally in
the baseline treatment T0. That is only 4% { less than the background error rate of 6% {
shy of 100%. These data suggests that task-form recognition is even more discriminating
in decision-theoretic experiments than game-form recognition is in game-theoretic exper-
iments, where it serves as a powerful marker of immunity to behavioral anomalies (Chou
et al., 2009; Ferraro and Vossler, 2010).
Treatment T1 shows, however, that task-form recognition is necessary but not su-
cient for task-form understanding. It is the latter that is methodologically fundamental,
and roughly corresponds to teleological knowledge as distinct from procedural knowledge
(VanLehn, 1990). In treatment T1, the proportion of rational responses among subjects
who recognize the Monty Hall task drops to 57%. By design, T1 requires understanding
of conditional probability reasoning. The easily learned rule, `It is rational to switch in
Monty Hall', is not eective in treatment T1. The 96% 57% = 39% dierence repre-
sents the proportion of subjects who (a) recognize the Monty Hall task form and choose
correctly in T0, but (b) fail to apply conditional probability calculus successfully in T1.
This 39% is a lower bound insofar as the bias triggered by T1 is in favor of the rational
response. Inferences based on task-form recognition alone may be grossly misleading.
In contrast a sucient condition is task-form understanding, which excludes recognition-
1Readers unfamiliar with the Monty Hall task may refer to Baseline treatment T0 on page 2.
90
Economics Bulletin, 2014, Vol. 34 No. 1 pp. 89-98
triggered behavioral rules (procedural knowledge) similar in spirit to those that may be
instilled through Skinnerian operant conditioning.
The treatments implemented in this experiment manipulate the triggers of three ef-
fects, all of which bias responses toward irrational sticking in the standard Monty Hall
task: (i) the default eect (Margolis, 2007; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) (ii) the illu-
sion of control eect (Granberg and Dorr, 1998) and (iii) the errors of omission vs. errors
of commission eect (Gilovich, Medvec and Chen, 1995). In the baseline treatment T0,
41% of the n=22 subjects who are unfamiliar with the Monty Hall task (MH-unfamiliar
subjects) choose rationally. This is more than triple the 10%{13% rational response rate
among non-sophisticated subjects. In treatment T1 { where biases reinforce the rational
response option { 73% of MH-unfamiliar subjects choose rationally. This dierence, which
is in the direction predicted by the bias-trigger hypothesis, is statistically signicant. In
treatment T2 { where bias triggers are neutralized { the rational response rate is 55%
among MH-unfamiliar subjects, which as predicted lies in-between the downward-biased
41% of T0 and the upward-biased 73% of T1.
Overall, the bias-trigger manipulations are successful. The fraction choosing rationally
in the bias-trigger-neutralized treatment T2 { 66% overall (71% and 55% among MH-
familiar and MH-unfamiliar subjects respectively) { surpasses that achieved in `one shot'
elsewhere. However neither approaches 100%, even adjusted for background error rates.
Task-form understanding is less than ubiquitous even among sophisticated subjects who
have received training in probability and statistics.
2 Design and procedures
This experiment combines three key elements: bias-trigger manipulation, direct elicitation
of task-form recognition, and a numerate sophisticated subject pool. The experiment,
including the Random Lottery Incentive (RLI) scheme, is implemented in z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). To enhance comparability with previous literature, Friedman's (1998)
playing card presentation format is employed.
Baseline treatment T0. The subject is shown three playing cards, two of which are red
and one of which is black as in Exhibit (1a). The subject stands to win e10 if she is
left holding the black card at the end of the following procedure. The cards are shued
and placed face down on a playing mat at positions 1{3 pictured in Exhibit (1c). The
subject is asked to choose one of the three face-down playing cards. This card, still face
down, is moved to the location marked YOUR CHOICE. From among the two cards
remaining at their original locations, one is revealed to be a red, non-winning card. Now,
just before revelation of whether the subject has won e10 or not, the subject is oered
an opportunity to switch from the card at YOUR CHOICE to the remaining face-down
card. The probability of obtaining the winning black card upon switching is 2/3.
`Choose two' treatment T1. Proceeds as in T0 except (i) that the playing mat is as
pictured in Exhibit (1d), and (ii) that the subject is asked to choose two cards. These are
moved to the two positions marked YOUR CHOICE. One of these two cards is revealed
to be a non-winning red card. Now, just before revelation of whether the subject has won
e10 or not, the subject is oered an opportunity to switch from her remaining face-down
card at YOUR CHOICE to the non-chosen card. The probability of obtaining the winning
black card upon sticking is 2/3.
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Exhibit 1: Virtual cards and mats (not to scale).
(a) Playing cards used in all four treatments T0{T3 (b) Number cards used in treatments T2 and T3
(c) Treatment T0 baseline task (d) Treatment T1 `choose two' task
(e) Treatment T2 bias-trigger-neutralized task (f) Treatment T3 unconditional probability task
Bias-trigger-neutralized treatment T2. In this treatment, playing cards in Exhibit (1a) are
shued and placed face-down at positions 1{3 on the right-hand-side of the playing mat
pictured in Exhibit (1e). In addition, the number cards in Exhibit (1b) are shued and
placed face-down at the three unmarked positions on the left-hand-side of this playing
mat. Then one of these cards is allocated to the subject, and it is moved to the location
marked UNKNOWN NUMBER. The value of this unknown number entitles the subject
to the playing card at the correspondingly numbered position on the right-hand side of
the playing mat. Now the playing card at POSITION 3 is identied as the set-aside card,
and moved to the SET-ASIDE CARD location on the mat. Among the remaining playing
cards at positions 1{2, a non-winning red card is revealed. Now, just before revelation
of whether the subject has won e10 or not, the subject is oered the choice between (i)
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keeping the unknown position entitlement (possibly to the known non-winning red card
at position 1 or 2), (ii) switching to the remaining face-down card at position 1 or 2, or
(iii) switching to the set-aside card. The probability of obtaining the winning black card
upon switching to the face-down POSITION 1 or 2 card is 2/3.
Unconditional probability treatment T3. Proceeds as in T2 except that the playing mat is
as pictured in Exhibit (1f) and there is no set-aside card. A single playing card is revealed
from among positions 1{3 to be a non-winning red card. Now, just before revelation of
whether the subject has won e10 or not, the subject is oered the choice between (i)
keeping the unknown position entitlement (possibly to the known non-winning red card
at position 1, 2 or 3), or (ii) switching to one of the two face-down cards remaining at
positions 1{3. The probability of obtaining the winning black card upon switching to a
face-down POSITION 1 or 2 or 3 card is 1/2.
Subjects. 71 subjects from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) ORSEE pool
were recruited in June/July of 2011. All subjects were enrolled in a KIT degree program
requiring quantitative skills, and all reported having completed at least one course in
mathematics or statistics. Less than 6% do not disclose their area of study. Among those
who do, the distribution is as follows: 72% engineering or engineering consortial programs,
10% physics, 9% informatics or information technology, 6% mathematics or mathematics
consortial programs, 3% geology or geology consortial programs. The average age is 22,
and 19% are female.
Procedures. All 71 subjects faced four treatments in one of four randomly assigned se-
quences.2 On average there were 9 subjects in each of eight 50-minute experimental
sessions held in the Institute of Economic Theory and Statistics laboratory (KIT). Upon
being seated at their stations, subjects were apprised of the rules of conduct and of the two-
part structure of the session. The rst part consisted of four choice scenarios (T0{T3).
At the beginning of each scenario, subjects were directed to consult detailed scenario-
specic written instructions, which set out the scenario procedure as clearly as possible.
The second, non-incentivized part of the session, comprised of (i) a questionnaire eliciting
the subject's probability beliefs across the four scenarios, and (ii) a screening question to
determine whether the subject had recognized any of the four scenarios.
Each subject received a show-up fee of e5 plus a possible additional e10, depending
on the playing-out of a randomly selected scenario from among T0{T3. Earnings were
paid out in cash at the end of the session.
3 Results
The choice data from Treatments T0{T3 are presented in Exhibit (2a) and illustrated in
Exhibit (2c). Associated hypothesis tests are presented in Exhibit (2b). The one-sided
p-value reported for the rst-row hypothesis H0 : ^T0F = ^T0U is obtained from Boschloo's
unconditional test of homogeneity. The remaining one-sided p-values are from exact
McNemar tests for repeated measures. The nal column reports Benjamini-Hochberg
adjusted pBH-values that control the false discovery rate in multiple hypothesis tests.
Elicited probability beliefs are summarized in Exhibit (2d).
The overall proportion of rational responses in the benchmark task T0 (79%) is un-
usually high (see Exhibit (2a)). We ascribe this to the sophisticated subject pool's (i)
2T0,T1,T2,T3; T1,T2,T3,T0; T2,T3,T1,T0; T3,T2,T1,T0
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Exhibit 2: Monty Hall choice data, hypothesis tests, and probability beliefs.
(a) Proportion choosing rationally, partitioned
by familiarity with Monty Hall.
Familiar Unfamiliar All
n=49 n =22 N=71
T0 96% 41% 79%
T1 57% 73% 62%
T2 71% 55% 66%
T3 94% 86% 92%




^T0F = ^T0U 0.000 0.000
^T0F = ^T1F 0.000 0.000
^T1F = ^T2F 0.059 0.059
^T0F = ^T2F 0.002 0.003
^T0U = ^T1U 0.046 0.058
(c) Proportion choosing rationally among MH-familiar (n = 49, red) and MH-









T0f T0u T1f T1u T2f T2u T3f T3u
0.96 0.57 0.71 0.940.41 0.73 0.55 0.86
(d) Probability beliefs, separately for MH-Unfamiliar and MH-Familiar subjects: (i) correct
probability beliefs, (ii) relative probability beliefs consistent with the rational choice, (iii)
conditional probability calculation failure, (iv) number of observations.
T0 T1 T2 T3
F U F U F U F U
(i) Correct 65% 15% 44% 14% 41% 11% 73% 60%
(ii) Consistent 94% 30% 50% 19% 64% 11% 100% 90%
(iii) 50%{50% 2% 55% 6% 52% 21% 56% na na
(iv) n 48 20 48 21 44 18 45 20
training in probability calculus and (ii) the 49/71 preponderance (69%) of subjects who
are Familiar with the Monty Hall task. The rational response rate among MH-Familiar
is 96%, while among the MH-Unfamiliar it is still 41%. Boschloo's unconditional test of
homogeneity rejects the hypothesis that these proportions are equal (row 1, Exhibit (2b)).
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The remaining rows in Exhibit (2b) report exact McNemar tests for repeated measures,
comparing rational response rates within the MH-Familiar (MH-Unfamiliar) group across
dierent treatments. Among the MH-Familiar, the 96% in T0 is statistically signicantly
dierent from the 57% in T1 and the 71% in T2. Among the MH-Unfamiliar, the 41% in
T0 is statistically signicantly dierent from the 73% in T1, but stops being so following
the Benjamini-Hochberg adjustment that controls the false discovery rate across the mul-
tiple comparisons in Exhibit (2b). Since T2 is the treatment that a priori neutralizes the
bias triggers present in T0 and T1, it is predicted that the T2 rational response rate falls
in-between those of T0 and T1. Indeed this turns out to be the case, and it places bounds
on the maximal eect size in comparisons involving T2, e.g. j^T0U ^T2Uj  ^T1U ^T0U and
j^T1U  ^T2Uj  ^T1U  ^T0U. This bound on eect size, combined with the MH-Unfamiliar
sub-sample size (n = 22), restricts the power of McNemar tests on the MH-Unfamiliar.
Exhibit 3: GEE model parameter estimates
Pooled (N=71) Familiar (n=49) Unfamiliar (n=22)
e p-value e p-value e p-value
T0 5.540 0.000 23.50 0.000 0.692 0.396
T1 2.311 0.008 1.333 0.319 2.667 0.040
T2 2.764 0.001 2.500 0.004 1.200 0.670
Unfamiliar 0.360 0.001
Familiar 1 na
In order to explicitly incorporate and account for the eect of within-subject corre-
lation, we estimate Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) models, specifying the link
function to be logit, the working correlation matrix to be unstructured, and the covari-
ance matrix estimator to be robust. The rst GEE model is estimated on the pooled
(N=71) data, with T0{T3 and (Un-)Familiar entered as main eects without an inter-
cept term. The second and third GEE models are estimated on the MH-Familiar (n=49)
and MH-Unfamiliar (n=22) subsets separately. Table 3 reports the exponentiated param-
eter estimates, i.e. the population-average odds, for each main-eect category, as well
as the associated two-sided Wald Chi-square statistic p-values. In the pooled model, all
main eects are signicant: treatments T0, T1 and T2, as well as the familiarity fac-
tor. Population-average probabilities may be recovered from the estimated odds (e) as
e=(1+e), where the odds themselves are multiplicative between treatment categories
and (Un-)Familiar. Notice that with the GEE population-average approach, the model-
implied probabilities match the raw data proportions when the GEE model is estimated
on the relevant restricted subset, e.g. 23:5=24:5 = 0:96 for T0 in the second (MH-Familiar)
model.
The probability belief data presented in Exhibit (2d) complements the choice data
examined above. Row (i) shows that 41%{44% of MH-Familiar subjects form correct
conditional probability beliefs in T1 and T2. In other words, the probability data con-
rms that a fraction of the MH-Familiar subjects are not going through the process
of calculating conditional probability. Row (i) also shows that only 11%{15% of MH-
Unfamiliar subjects correctly form conditional probability beliefs in the MH tasks. This
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is comparable to the 10%{13% rational response rates in standard one-shot MH tasks
(Friedman, 1998; Krauss and Wang, 2003). Most MH-Unfamiliar subjects are poor condi-
tional probability reasoners, despite being drawn from a `sophisticated' pool and having
had training in probability calculus. This is also borne out in row (iii), which shows that
52%{56% of MH-Unfamiliar subjects' probability beliefs { i.e. their modal beliefs { are of
the `equally likely' type across tasks T0{T2. Also evident in row (iii) is the relative paucity
of MH-Familiar subjects displaying `equally likely' type beliefs across T0{T2, although
the format of T2 is ostensibly more dicult for these subjects than T0{T1. Finally, row
(ii) reports the fraction of subjects whose probability beliefs { whether correct or erro-
neous { are consistent with the rational response. Among the MH-Familiar, the row (ii)
rational-response-consistent beliefs (94%,50%,64%) closely match the Exhibit (2a) ratio-
nal choice proportions (96%,57%,71%). However among the MH-Unfamiliar there is not
this close correspondence: the vector of dierences between rational-response-consistent
beliefs and rational choice proportions is (11%, 54%, 44%). According to McNemar's
exact test, the proportions are statistically signicantly dierent on tasks T1 (p=0.002)
and T2 (p=0.004). It is evident that among the MH-Unfamiliar, probability beliefs do
not account for all of the variation in choice across MH tasks.
4 Conclusion
This experiment oers fresh perspective on the MH Paradox and its robustness. Its
resilience is not attributable to a single factor, but to the co-incidence of (i) widespread
prevalence of (erroneous) 50%{50% probability beliefs, in which the perceived probability
of success is equally balanced between sticking and switching in the MH task, and (ii)
multiple, mutually reinforcing biases triggered by the standard MH task. A decision-
making bias will be particularly eective in swaying the choice of an individual whose
probability beliefs leave her balanced on a knife edge between sticking and switching.
And the structure of the MH task triggers three, mutually reinforcing biases: the default
eect, the illusion of control eect, and the preference for errors omission over errors of
commission. Repetition with feedback, especially in combination with social or market
learning, eventually changes probability beliefs and thereby increases the rational response
rate. But without changing the structure of the MH task, this learning process is hindered
by the multiple, mutually reinforcing biases triggered by the standard MH task. By
subtly altering the structure of the MH task, one may address the task-triggered biases,
but this leaves the underlying erroneous probability beliefs unchanged. Hence conditional
probability reasoning skills as well as bias triggers must be addressed in concert.
Heterogeneity in probability reasoning sophistication masks the eects of bias-trigger
manipulation in raw sample averages. These data show that there are four subclasses:
those who are poor conditional probability reasoners; those who do not recognize the MH
task, but correctly calculate conditional probabilities (a small minority); those who recog-
nize the MH task and have procedural knowledge that they associate with this recognition
(i.e. `Switch in Monty Hall'); and those who not only recognize the MH task, but have
understanding { i.e. teleological knowledge { of the conditional probability reasoning un-
derpinning rationality in the MH task. Among subjects who are familiar with the MH
task, the T0{T2 data show that it is necessary to distinguish between task-form recogni-
tion (procedural knowledge) and task-form understanding (teleological knowledge). The
importance of the former has been established in game-theoretic experimental economics
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(Chou et al., 2009; Ferraro and Vossler, 2010). Yet the present experiment shows that
task-form recognition is necessary but not sucient for rational choice in MH-type con-
ditional probability reasoning tasks. Instead, task-form understanding { a concept that
is new to the eld of experimental economics, but well known in the eld of mathematics
education as `teleological knowledge' (VanLehn, 1990) { constitutes the necessary and
sucient form knowledge. Finally, among subjects who are not familiar with the MH
task, the choice data conrm that treatment T0 (the standard MH task) triggers bias
against the rational response option, treatment T1 triggers bias in favor of the rational
response option, and treatment T2 neutralizes the bias triggers.
Overall, the data vindicate the paper's objective of tackling the MH task's bias triggers
at source, preserving its one-shot nature. Rational choice may be enhanced or suppressed
through bias-trigger manipulation. Indeed the MH task may also be modied to eliminate
the bias triggers. Probability beliefs { whether reecting failure of conditional probability
reasoning, consistency with rational choice due to task-form recognition, or consistency
with rational choice due to task-form understanding { become reected in rational-choice
proportions dierently depending on the bias-trigger manipulation embodied in the par-
ticular MH task under investigation.
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